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A skirmish in the early reception of 
Karl Barth in Scotland: 
The exchange between Thomas F. Torrance 
and Brand Blanshard
Edited by Iain and Morag Torrance
The	name	of	Brand	Blanshard	may	not	be	as	familiar	today	as	it	once	
was.	Blanshard	was	one	of	the	greatest	American	philosophers	of	the	
first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	Born	 in	 Fredericksburg,	Ohio	 in	
August	1892,	Blanshard	was	the	son	of	a	Congregational	minister.	He	
studied	first	at	 the	University	of	Michigan,	and	 then	won	a	Rhodes	
Scholarship	 to	 study	 at	 Oxford,	 where	 he	was	 taught	 by	H.	W.	 B.	
Joseph	and	met	F.	H.	Bradley	and	T.	S.	Eliot.	He	gained	a	doctorate	
at	Harvard,	taught	at	Swarthmore	College	1925–44	and	then	at	Yale	
until	he	retired	in	1961.	He	died	in	1987.	Blanshard	is	often	regarded	
as	the	last	of	the	great	‘absolute	idealists’,	and	his	study	The Nature 
of Thought1	was	recommended	to	the	second	year	class	in	Logic	and	
Metaphysics	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh	in	the	1960s	when	the	set	
text	was	F.	H.	Bradley’s	The Principles of Logic.	In	1952,	Blanshard	
delivered	the	Gifford	Lectures	at	the	University	of	St	Andrews.	
The	 daily	 newspaper	 The Scotsman	 reported	 on	 the	 Gifford	
Lectures	and	ran	a	short	article	noting	that	Blanshard	had	indulged	in	a	
swipe	against	Karl	Barth.	This	was	too	much	for	Thomas	F.	Torrance,	
at	 that	 point	 still	 Professor	 of	 Church	History	 at	New	College,2	 to	
swallow	without	a	response.	A	theological	argument	followed,	which	
The Scotsman	 was	 kind	 enough	 to	 publish	 in	 full,	 day	 after	 day,	
throughout	April	1952.3	
There	 follow	 the	 initial	 report	 of	Brand	Blanshard’s	 comments,	
and	then	the	exchange	of	letters.	
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Report in The Scotsman, April 11, 1952, p. 6
“THEOLOGY OF CRISIS”
Professor Blanshard resumes Gifford Lectures
Professor	 Brand	 Blanshard,	 Yale	 University,	 resumed	 his	
series	of	Gifford	Lectures	at	St	Andrews	University	last	night	
with	a	statement	and	criticism	of	the	new	“theology	of	crisis.”	
The	leaders	of	the	movement	are	the	theologians,	Karl	Barth	
and	Emil	Brunner,	both	of	whom	have	 themselves	delivered	
Gifford	lectures	in	recent	years,	Barth	at	Aberdeen	and	Brunner	
at	St	Andrews.
The	 new	 theology,	 Professor	 Blanshard	 said,	 owed	 its	
attractiveness	 to	 its	 very	 bold	 strategy.	 Faith	 was	 not	 to	 be	
achieved	by	thought	or	any	other	sort	of	effort	on	our	part;	it	
was	the	result	of	a	“divine	encounter,”	a	one-way	transaction	in	
which	God	Himself	descended	into	the	human	spirit.
Because	they	were	so	sure	that	faith	was	beyond	the	reach	
of	reason,	Barth	and	Brunner	accepted	undisturbed	the	results	
of	scientific	criticism.	They	could	admit	that	the	Scripture	was	
full	 of	 errors,	 and	 that	 in	 the	 long	 struggle	of	 theology	with	
science,	 science	 had	 been	 generally	 right.	 They	 could	 hold	
this	because	they	believed	that	faith	provided	an	insight	of	its	
own,	different	from	that	of	reason,	and	above	it.	Unfortunately,	
when	we	tried	to	learn	from	them	what	it	was	that	the	insight	
disclosed,	 we	 got	 most	 unsatisfying	 answers.	 Barth	 and	
Brunner,	like	their	master,	Kierkegaard,	revelled	in	paradoxes.	
Indeed,	they	represented	God	as	being	so	completely	“other”	
that	He	almost	disappeared;	we	were	supposed	to	believe	things	
about	Him	that,	by	our	standards,	were	self-contradictory,	and	
ascribe	actions	to	Him	that	our	moral	sense	could	only	regard	
as	evil.
Professor	 Blanshard	 considered	 that	 this	 attempt	 to	 save	
religious	 faith	 by	 making	 it	 irrational	 was	 disastrous.	 The	
probable	effect	upon	thoughtful	men	of	asking	that	they	believe	
the	incredible	would	be	the	repudiation	of	faith	altogether.	If	
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revelation	occurred,	it	must	come	through	our	human	faculties	
and	share	the	strength	and	weakness	of	these	faculties.
Letter from Torrance
published	in The Scotsman,	April	14,	1952,	p.	4
Theology of Karl Barth
New	College,	University	of	Edinburgh,
April	11,	1952
Sir,—I	 have	 read	 with	 astonishment	 the	 account	 in	 your	
columns	 of	 the	 recent	 Gifford	 Lecture	 in	 St	 Andrews,	 in	
which	 Professor	 Brand	 Blanshard	 is	 reported	 as	 describing	
the	theology	of	Karl	Barth	and	Emil	Brunner	as	the	“theology	
of	 crisis”	 and	 criticising	 it	 as	 “this	 attempt	 to	 save	 religious	
faith	 by	 making	 it	 irrational.”	 It	 seems	 difficult	 to	 believe	
that	a	philosopher	as	great	as	Professor	Blanshard	should	still	
perpetrate	this	antiquated	blunder	and	be	so	plainly	unaware	of	
the	writings	of	these	Swiss	theologians.
A	 more	 rational	 and	 responsible	 evaluation	 has	 recently	
been	given	by	the	Roman	Catholic	theologian,	Hans	Urs	von	
Balthasar,	who	regards	Karl	Barth	as	the	greatest	protagonist	of	
the	Protestant	Church	and	who	pleads	with	the	Roman	Church	
to	take	their	measure	of	him	in	the	most	serious	way.
In	his	recent	work,	“Karl	Barth,	Deutung	und	Darstellung	
seiner	 Theologie,”	 von	 Balthasar	 takes	 careful	 account	 of	
the	 development	 of	 Barth’s	 theology,	 which	 falls	 into	 three	
main	 stages:	 1,	 The	 early	 period	 reaching	 its	 climax	 with	
the	first	 edition	of	his	 “Romans”	 in	1918,	when	he	was	 still	
under	the	influence	of	the	idealist	philosophy;	2,	the	nineteen-
twenties,	which	saw	a	thorough	revision	of	his	“Romans”	and	
the	first	volume	of	his	projected	Dogmatics	when	Barth	had	
come	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 Kierkegaard	 and	 his	 theology	
became	 dialectical	 and	 realist;	 3,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 that	 decade,	
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however,	came	the	really	decisive	change	when,	in	his	study	
of	Anselm,	Barth	swept	aside	the	language	of	Kierkegaard	and	
existentialism	and	emerged,	as	he	said,	out	of	his	egg-shells.
Ever	since	then	the	theology	of	Barth	has	been	the	theology	
of	 analogy	 in	 which	 Christology	 plays	 the	 dominant	 rôle.	
It	 is	more	 than	 thirty	 years	 ago	 since	 that	 important	 change	
took	place,	and	all	 the	enormous	volumes	of	his	“Kirchliche	
Dogmatik”	 have	 been	 published	 since	 then.	 These	 are	 the	
volumes	 in	which	Barth	has	 taken	issue	 in	 the	most	massive	
way	with	the	theology	of	Rome,	and	from	which	von	Balthasar	
has	admittedly	learned	so	much.	It	is	a	pitiful	tragedy,	however,	
that	 the	 American	 philosopher	 has	 not	 apparently	 peered	
beyond	the	egg-shells	of	the	young	Swiss	thinker!
One	 would	 like	 to	 recommend	 Professor	 Blanshard	 at	
least	 to	 read	Karl	Barth’s	 study	of	Anselm,	“Fides	Quaerens	
Intellectum,”	published	 in	1931.	 In	 that	 little	volume	we	are	
given	a	clear	account	of	Professor	Barth’s	teaching	about	the	
relation	between	faith	and	reason	which	informs	the	whole	of	
his	dogmatic	theology.	There	Barth	holds	to	the	basic	point	that	
reason	is	unconditionally	bound	to	its	object	and	determined	by	
it,	and	that	the	nature	of	the	object	must	prescribe	the	specific	
mode	of	the	activity	of	reason.	Faith	is	this	reason	directed	to	
the	knowledge	of	God,	and	 involves	a	 rational	apprehension	
which	answers	appropriately	to	the	object	given.	Here	the	object	
is	 unique	 and	 incomparable.	What	 is	 expected	 of	 theology,	
therefore,	is	that	it	should	exhibit	the	kind	of	rationality	which	
corresponds	 with	 this	 unique	 object	 of	 thought.	 This	 is,	 in	
fact,	 the	 rational	 objectivity	 which	 characterises	 faith,	 and	
which	utterly	repudiates	that	salto mortale,	the	sacrifice	of	the	
intellect.
That	 the	Gifford	 lecturer	 should	attribute	 to	Karl	Barth	a	
view	 which	 all	 his	 writings	 for	 thirty	 years	 have	 resolutely	
opposed	is	particularly	surprising	to-day	when	Barth	stands	out	
in	Europe	 as	 the	 great	 protagonist	 against	 irrationalism,	 and	
against	existentialism	which,	particularly	in	the	hands	of	a	new	
school	of	interpreters,	headed	by	Professor	Rudolf	Bultmann,	
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of	Marburg,	is	producing	a	radical	reinterpretation	of	the	Bible	
that	we	can	only	regard	as	a	menace	to	the	Christian	Gospel.—I	
am	&	c.
(Professor)	T.	F.	Torrance.
Letter from Blanshard 
published	in The Scotsman,	April	16,	1952,	p.	6
Theology of Karl Barth
The	University	of	St	Andrews,
April	14,	1952
Sir,—Professor	 Torrance	 has	 expressed	 “astonishment”	 that	
in	 one	 of	my	Gifford	 lectures	 at	 St	Andrews	 I	 should	 have	
described	the	theology	of	Karl	Barth	and	Emil	Brunner	as	an	
irrationalist	theology.	His	astonishment	can	hardly	be	greater	
than	mine	when	I	find	this	description	denied.
The	best	way,	of	course,	 is	 to	go	 to	 the	writings	of	 these	
men	and	read	their	own	words.	Let	me	cite	a	few	of	them.	First	
a	few	from	various	books	by	Brunner:	“Revealed	knowledge	
is	 poles	 apart	 from	 rational	 knowledge.	These	 two	 forms	 of	
knowledge	are	as	far	apart	as	heaven	is	from	hell.”	“Biblical	
and	 natural	 theology	 will	 never	 agree;	 they	 are	 bitterly	 and	
fundamentally	opposed.”	 (“Revelation	and	Reason,”	16,	65.)	
“The	theological	problem	as	well	as	the	Church	problem	is	this	
–	to	deliver	modern	man	and	the	modernised	Church	from	the	
illegitimate	self-sufficiency	of	reason	…”	(“The	Word	and	the	
World,”	126.)	“Of	the	truth	of	God	it	must	ever	be	said,	since	it	
is	God’s	truth,	that	it	is	foolishness	unto	human	reason.”	“This	
pride,	 this	claim	of	 reason	 to	be	 the	court	of	 last	appeal,	 the	
superior	judge	of	truth,	constitutes	sin;	it	is	the	heart	of	sin.”	
(“Theology	 of	 Crisis,”	 43.)	 Incidentally,	 Professor	 Torrance	
expresses	 surprise	 that	 I	 should	 have	 referred	 to	 this	 school	
as	 “the	 theology	 of	 crisis”;	 the	 phrase	 is	 Brunner’s	 own	
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description,	and	the	title	of	one	of	his	books.	Such	expressions	
as	the	above	could	be	multiplied	many	times	from	Brunner’s	
writings.	
Barth	 is,	 if	 anything,	 more	 extreme	 than	 Brunner.	 He	
began	his	Gifford	lectures	by	repudiating	the	very	possibility	
of	 a	 rational	knowledge	of	God	 through	natural	 theology.	 “I	
certainly	 see	 –	 with	 astonishment	 –	 that	 such	 a	 science	 as	
Lord	Gifford	has	in	mind	does	exist,	but	I	do	not	see	how	it	
is	possible	for	it	to	exist.	I	am	convinced	that	so	far	as	it	has	
existed,	and	still	exists,	it	owes	its	existence	to	a	radical	error	
...	 it	 cannot	 really	be	 the	business	of	 a	Reformed	 theologian	
to	raise	so	much	as	his	little	finger	to	support	this	undertaking	
in	 any	 positive	 way”	 (5–6.)	 Again,	 “It	 is	 forced	 down	 my	
throat	that	the	Dogmatic	theologian	is	under	the	obligation	to	
‘justify’	himself	in	his	utterances	before	philosophy.	To	that	my	
answer	 is	 likewise	 ‘No.’	 ...	Dogmatics	 runs	counter	 to	every	
philosophy,	no	matter	what	form	it	may	have	assumed	...	our	
activities	of	thinking	and	speaking	...	cannot	possibly	coincide	
with	the	truth	of	God	...”	(“Credo,”	185–6.)	Professor	Torrance	
will	recall	that	Barth’s	famous	break	with	Brunner	was	largely	
on	the	ground	that	Brunner	had	shown	a	weakness	for	natural	
theology,	 while	 he,	 Barth,	 thought	 it	 should	 be	 treated	with	
contempt	and	scorn.	“If	you	really	reject	natural	theology,	you	
don’t	 stand	 and	 stare	 at	 the	 snake	while	 you	 let	 it	 stare	 you	
down	 in	 return,	hypnotise	you,	and	 then	bite	you:	when	you	
see	 it,	 you	 take	 a	 stick	 to	 it	 and	kill	 it.”	 (“Nein! Antwart an 
Brunner,”	13;	my	translation.)
If	 statements	 like	 this	 do	 not	 justify	 calling	 a	 man	 an	
anti-rationalist,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 conceive	what	would.	 Professor	
Torrance	suggests	 that	Barth’s	anti-rationalism	belongs	 to	an	
earlier	stage	that	he	has	long	out-grown,	and	refers	to	a	work	of	
1931	as	giving	his	mature	opinion.	But	every	quotation	I	have	
made	from	him	is	subsequent	to	that	date.
When	Professor	Torrance	describes	Barth	as	a	defender	of	
reason,	he	can	only	be	using	“reason”	with	a	special	meaning	
and	 a	 very	 different	meaning	 from	 that	 of	 the	 philosophers.	
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He	thinks	it	enough	if	he	shows	that	faith	for	Barth	“involves	
a	 rational	 apprehension	which	 answers	 approximately	 to	 the	
object	given.”	But	what	if	“the	object	given”	–	namely,	God	–	is	
taken	as	“the	absolutely	other,”	which	defies	all	the	categories	
of	natural	reason?	To	“answer	appropriately”	to	such	an	object,	
reason,	as	we	know	it,	must	simply	die	and	be	born	again	as	
something	 else.	 If	 one	 claims	 to	believe	 in	 reason,	 it	 should	
surely	mean	the	reason	used	in	common-sense	and	science,	for	
example,	the	science	of	natural	theology.	Barth	maintains	that	
God	stands	over	against	such	reason	as	utterly	and	hopelessly	
impenetrable.	That,	to	me	and,	I	think,	to	most	philosophers,	is	
what	irrationalism	means.—I	am	&c.
Brand BlanShard.
Letter from Rev. D. W. Greenfield
published	in	The Scotsman,	April	18,	1952,	p.	4
Theology of Karl Barth
34	Warrender	Park	Terrace,	Edinburgh.
April	16,	1952
Sir,—Kingsley	asked	on	a	memorable	occasion,	“What,	then,	
does	Father	Newman	mean?”	The	answer	was	the	“Apologia.”	
Barth’s	reply	to	such	a	question	would	certainly	lack	that	clarity	
which	we	associate	with	the	great	cardinal,	and	therefore	it	is	
not	perhaps	surprising	that	Professor	Blanshard	and	Professor	
Torrance	should	have	understood	him	differently.	They	are	not	
alone	in	that.
To	 the	 uninstructed,	 however,	 it	 may	 seem	 that	 the	
professors	are	arguing	at	cross	purposes.	Professor	Blanshard	
appears	 to	 accuse	 Barth	 and	 his	 school	 of	 “irrationalism”;	
but	 by	 “irrationalism”	 he	 only	means	 that	 Barth	 denies	 that	
a	knowledge	of	God	can	be	obtained	by	 the	 reason	used	“in	
commonsense	and	science.”
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But	 if	 in	 this	 sense	 Barth	 is	 “irrational”	 he	 stands	 in	
good	company.	I	can	think	at	the	moment	of	no	considerable	
theologian	who	believed	that	the	whole	truth	of	God	could	be	
reached	by	reason.	Even	the	English	deists	accepted	revelation,	
and	the	distinction	which	St	Thomas	Aquinas	draws	between	
natural	 and	 revealed	 religion	 is	well	 known.	Barth	 stands	 in	
the	succession	of	all	theologians,	Reformed	and	Roman,	in	his	
assertion	that	salvation	is	of	faith.
It	 is	 true	that	Barth	in	denying	that	 there	is	any	place	for	
“natural	religion”	goes	further	than	many	theologians.	Yet	the	
comparative	sterility	of	Gifford	lectureships,	of	which	complaint	
was	recently	made	in	your	correspondence,	seems	to	show	that	
“commonsense”	helps	us	little	towards	our	knowledge	of	God.	
Indeed,	 all	 the	work	 of	 the	 very	 distinguished	 thinkers	who	
have	lectured	under	this	foundation	amounts	to	nothing	more	
than	a	prolegomenon	to	Christian	theology.
We	may	go	further	and	say	that	even	the	scientist	and	the	
philosopher,	no	less	than	the	poet	or	the	artist,	are	“irrational.”	
As	has	been	often	pointed	out,	most	of	the	greatest	discoveries	
have	been	due	to	a	saltus fidei.
It	 appears	 to	 all	 come	 down	 to	 a	 use	 of	 terms,	 and	 the	
question	would	rather	appear	to	be,	“Canst	thou	by	searching	
find	out	God?”—I	am	&c.	
(Rev.)	david W. Greenfield.
Letter from Torrance
published	in The Scotsman,	April	19,	1952,	p.	6
Theology of Karl Barth
New	College,	University	of	Edinburgh,
April	18,	1952
Sir,—I	should	like	to	thank	Professor	Blanshard	for	taking	the	
trouble	in	the	midst	of	his	Gifford	Lectures	to	reply	to	my	letter.
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It	 is	 clear	 that	 his	 charge	 of	 anti-rationalism	 against	 the	
theology	of	Karl	Barth	 involves	 a	particular	view	of	 reason,	
but	 he	 cannot	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 a	 view	 generally	 accepted	 by	
philosophers	 to-day,	 by	 Professor	 MacKinnon	 or	 Professor	
Ryle,	 for	 example.	 There	 are,	 however,	 three	 distinct	 if	
inseparable	issues	which	should	be	laid	bare.
1.	A	philosophical	issue	between	an	idealist	view	of	reason,	
and	 a	 realist	 and	 critical	 view.	 Philosophically,	 Karl	 Barth	
stands	within	the	European	tradition	of	critical	philosophy,	of	
which	 his	 brother	Heinrich	Barth,	 Professor	 of	Metaphysics	
in	 the	University	of	Basel,	 is	perhaps	 the	most	distinguished	
representative	 on	 the	 Continent.	With	 him	 Karl	 Barth	 is	 in	
profound	agreement.
But	to	come	to	this	university,	Professor	John	Macmurray,	
like	Heinrich	and	Karl	Barth,	is	concerned	to	point	philosophy	
and	theology	away	from	a	substantival	to	a	functional	view	of	
reason,	and	when	he	says	that	“reason	is	the	capacity	to	behave	
in	 terms	of	 the	nature	of	 the	object,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 to	behave	
objectively,”	he	is	using	language	almost	identical	with	that	of	
Karl	Barth	–	and	no	one	would	surely	wish	to	call	Professor	
Macmurray	an	anti-rationalist!
Against	 this	 view	 Professor	 Blanshard	 appears	 to	 think	
of	 reason	 as	 behaving	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 own	 nature,	 in	 terms	
of	 the	 categories	 of	 its	 own	understanding.	 It	 is	 against	 that	
autonomous,	 self-sufficient	 reason,	 reason	 turned	 in	 upon	
itself,	that	the	citations	from	Professor	Emil	Brunner	given	by	
Professor	Blanshard	are	directed.	That	is,	they	are	directed	not	
against	 reason	 as	 such,	 but	 against	 a	 diseased	 “rationalism.”	
Professor	Karl	Barth	prefers	to	call	this	“heresy”	(in	the	literal	
Greek	sense	of	the	word)	as	the	self-willed	reason	that	chooses	
to	go	its	own	way	and	refuses	to	be	determined	by	its	object.	
Far	from	being	anti-rational,	this	is	to	champion	reason	against	
an	irrational	subjectivism.
No	doubt	it	is	true,	as	Mr	Greenfield	points	out	to-day,	that	
Professor	Blanshard	and	I	are	arguing	at	cross	purposes,	to	a	
certain	extent	at	any	rate,	though	the	very	citations	Professor	
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Blanshard	 has	 made	 from	 both	 Barth	 and	 Brunner	 and	 the	
use	he	makes	of	them	indicate	a	very	superficial	and	indeed	a	
mistaken	reading	of	these	theologians.
2.	A	scientific	issue.	It	is	surely	an	elementary	principle	of	
science	that	the	nature	of	the	object	must	prescribe	the	specific	
mode	of	 the	activity	of	 reason,	 and	 that	 reason	must	 answer	
appropriately	to	the	object	given.	It	would	be	utterly	unscientific	
and	irrational,	for	example,	to	transpose	into	the	study	of	living	
organisms	 the	 specific	mode	 of	 rational	 activity	 that	 obtains	
in	the	study	of	physics	and	the	particular	categories	that	arise	
in	 that	 connection.	 That	 is	 why	 Karl	 Barth	 insists	 that	 the	
theologian	must	pursue	his	theological	science	without	seeking	
to	justify	his	undertaking	before	the	bar	of	natural	science	or	
philosophy	or	the	so-called	natural	reason,	for	it	would	be	quite	
unscientific	and	irrational	in	theological	science,	where	we	are	
concerned	with	God	as	the	object	of	knowledge,	for	reason	to	
behave	either	in	terms	of	its	own	nature	or	in	terms	of	some	
other	object	alien	to	that	particular	field	of	study.
What	theology	demands,	therefore,	declares	Karl	Barth,	is	
a	ruthless	scientific	criticism	of	the	activity	of	reason	and	of	the	
reasoner	himself	to	ensure	that	here	in	theological	science	he	is	
behaving	rationally,	that	is,	that	here	his	reason	is	conforming	
properly	 and	 obediently	 to	 the	 object	 given.	 All	 science,	
be	 it	 theology	or	physics,	 is	 characterised	by	humility	and	a	
readiness	for	the	most	ruthless	self-criticism.	That	is	precisely	
why	Barth	is	so	critical	of	rational	activity	in	theology,	in	order	
to	be	as	rational	and	responsible	as	possible.
It	is	because	Karl	Barth	has	carried	this	ruthless,	scientific	
criticism	throughout	the	whole	of	his	“Kirchliche	Dogmatik”	
that	 scientists	 in	 other	 fields	 are	 showing	 such	 increasing	
interest	in	and	understanding	of	his	work,	not	least	those	in	the	
natural	sciences	–	see	the	letter	by	an	American	physicist	from	
the	University	 of	Minnesota	 published	 in	 the	 “Kirchenblatt”	
(Basel),	March	27.
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3.	 A	 religious	 issue.	 The	 great	 difference	 between	
theological	and	natural	science	concerns	the	difference	in	the	
nature	 of	 the	 object.	The	object	 of	 theological	 knowledge	 is	
God	infinite	and	eternal,	“always	Subject.”	As	Barth	puts	it,	not	
“the	absolutely	other”	(a	notion	which	Barth	cast	away	many	
years	 ago),	 but	 the	 living	God	who	gives	Himself	 to	us	 and	
reveals	Himself	in	Jesus	Christ,	and	summons	us	to	obedient	
conformity	to	Him.	In	Christian	theology,	therefore,	reason	is	
summoned	to	behave	in	terms	of	Jesus	Christ,	or	as	the	New	
Testament	puts	it,	to	conform	to	His	image	in	love.
Here	 the	 ruthless	 criticism,	 mentioned	 above,	 is	 spoken	
of	as	self-denial	and	taking	up	of	the	Cross,	and	that	ruthless	
criticism	 is	 directed	 toward	 the	 theologian	 and	 his	 rational	
activity	to	insure	that	he	behaves	consciously	in	terms	of	the	
nature	of	the	object,	i.e.,	that	he	is	obedient	to	the	living	Christ.
It	is	here,	of	course,	that	the	Christian	doctrine	of	sin	enters	
in,	for	sin	is	self-will,	the	attempt	of	reason	to	behave	in	terms	
of	itself	and	its	own	norms	instead	of	behaving	in	terms	of	the	
love	of	Christ.	It	is	understandable	that	the	autonomous	reason	
should	here	be	“offended”	at	the	Cross,	and	that	the	preaching	
of	the	Cross	should	be	“foolishness”	to	him.
If	 that	 is	 the	 real	 reason	 why	 Professor	 Blanshard	 calls	
Karl	Barth’s	 view	of	 reason	 anti-rationalism,	 then	 it	 is	 clear	
that	the	real	issue	does	not	lie	between	Blanshard	and	Barth,	
but	 between	 Blanshard	 and	 the	 Christian	 Gospel.	 But	 even	
apart	from	this	offence	at	 the	Cross	which	makes	foolish	the	
wisdom	of	 this	world,	 as	St	 Paul	 puts	 it,	 surely	 it	would	 be	
a	highly	unscientific	and	 irrational	way	for	 reason	 to	behave	
if	when	directed	to	know	the	living	God	it	refused	to	answer	
appropriately	 to	His	Self-revelation,	but	 insisted	 instead	 that	
God	must	conform	to	the	categories	that	reason	had	acquired	
elsewhere	in	“common	sense	and	science.”—I	am	&c.
ThomaS f. Torrance.
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Letter from Blanshard
published	in The Scotsman,	April	22,	1952,	p.	6
Theology of Karl Barth
University	of	St	Andrews,
April	20,	1952
Sir,—Professor	Torrance’s	courteous	letter	of	April	19	suggests	
that	the	issue	between	us	over	the	“theology	of	crisis”	is	a	very	
complex	one.	It	seems	to	me	quite	simple.
The	question	is	whether	Brunner	and	Barth	are	to	be	called	
anti-rationalists.	I	hold	that	they	are,	on	the	ground	that	both	
have	 over	 and	 over	 again,	 and	 in	 the	 most	 explicit	 terms,	
denied	 that	 the	 standards	 of	 natural	 reason,	 the	 reason	 used	
by	 scientists	 and	 philosophers,	 are	 valid	 for	 the	 knowledge	
of	 God.	 Professor	 Torrance	 agrees	 that	 they	 deny	 this,	 but	
thinks	 this	 insufficient	 to	 justify	 the	name	of	 anti-rationalist.	
They	really	believe	in	reason,	he	says,	if	only	we	take	“reason”	
broadly	enough.	What	is	the	broader	meaning	he	proposes?	It	
is	conformity	 to	 the	object.	Since	Barth	and	Brunner	believe	
that	the	mind	can	in	some	sense	conform	to	God,	they	may	be	
said	to	believe	in	a	rational	knowledge	of	Him.	
Now	 with	 all	 respect	 to	 an	 able	 theologian,	 I	 think	 this	
is	 juggling	 with	 words.	 That	 Brunner	 and	 Barth	 do	 believe	
in	 such	 conformity	 I	 agree.	But	whether	 it	 should	 be	 called	
rational	or	not	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	object	conformed	
to.	 If	 that	 object	 requires	 that,	 to	 conform	 to	 it,	 we	 must	
accept	both	 sides	of	 a	 contradiction,	 to	 call	 such	conformity	
“rational	 knowledge”	 seems	 to	me	 perverse.	And	 yet	 that	 is	
precisely	 what	 conformity	 does	 require	 by	 those	 authors’	
explicit	 admission.	 Brunner	 says	 that	 at	 some	 points	 the	
teaching	he	accepts,	“regarded	purely	from	the	theological	and	
intellectual	point	of	view,	 is	an	irreconcilable	contradiction.”	
And	Barth	insists	that	our	thinking	“cannot	possibly	coincide	
with	the	truth	of	God.”	Now	to	describe	as	“rational”	a	kind	of	
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knowledge	that	to	our	natural	reason	is	not	only	unintelligible	
but	self-contradictory,	 is	 to	empty	 the	word	of	all	 its	normal	
meaning.	The	reason	whose	competence	Barth	and	Brunner	are	
here	denying	is	not	reason	in	some	technical	sense,	the	reason,	
for	example,	of	certain	schools	of	philosophy;	it	is	the	reason	
every	man	does	and	must	use	if	he	is	to	think	coherently	at	all.
Furthermore,	if	mere	conformity	to	an	object	is	enough	to	
make	 our	 response	 to	 it	 rational,	we	 should	 have	 to	 rewrite	
the	 theory	 of	 knowledge.	 We	 should	 have	 to	 include	 as	
rational	 knowledge	 the	 ineffable	 rapport	 of	 the	 mystic,	 the	
Buddhists’s	absorption	in	Nirvana,	the	musician’s	response	to	
an	 aria,	 and,	 I	 suppose,	 the	 child’s	 response	 to	 a	 command.	
Even	 Schopenhauer’s	 irrationalism,	 since	 it	 provided	 for	 an	
adjustment	 to	 the	 irrational	Will	would,	 so	 far,	 be	 a	 form	of	
rationalism.	This	is	stretching	a	meaning	beyond	the	breaking	
point.
And	what	is	to	be	gained	by	so	stretching	it?	You	will	never	
convince	the	philosopher	by	these	verbal	conjurings	that	Barth	
and	Brunner	really	believe	in	reason	as	he	does,	and	you	are	
likely	to	lose	the	support	of	others.	The	new	theology	has	made	
its	way	 largely	because	of	 its	boldness	 in	 repudiating	 reason	
openly.	 Instead	of	 trying	 to	meet	 philosophy	 and	 science	on	
their	own	grounds,	as	liberal	theology	did,	it	has	sought	to	turn	
the	tables	on	them	by	rejecting	the	authority	of	their	rational	
standards	in	the	field	of	religion.	This	was	a	courageous	move	
which,	whether	sound	or	not,	did	give	some	hope	of	keeping	
the	rationalists	at	bay.	But	to	offer	the	Barth-Brunner	theology	
to	philosophers	as	a	rational	account	of	things	is	to	invite	them	
to	swarm	down	on	you	like	devouring	locusts.	And	Professor	
Torrance	 will	 agree	 with	 me	 that	 they	 may	 be	 a	 dreadful	
pest.—I	am	&c.
Brand BlanShard.
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Letter from Torrance
published	in The Scotsman,	April	23,	1952,	p.	6
Theology of Karl Barth
New	College,	University	of	Edinburgh,
April	22,	1952
Sir,—It	is	increasingly	clear	from	Professor	Blanshard’s	good-
natured	 replies	 to	my	criticisms	 that	 the	 issue	between	us	 is	
not	 a	 simple	 one,	 as	 he	 maintains,	 but	 involves	 the	 whole	
philosophical	 debate	 of	 modern	 times,	 particularly	 since	
Wilhelm	 Dilthey,	 about	 the	 relation	 between	 knowing	 and	
being,	thinking	and	acting,	logic	and	history.
Professor	 Blanshard	 still	 maintains	 apparently	 the	 old	
idealist	view	of	a	natural	reason	which	exists	independently	of	
the	objectively	given	world	and	which	bears	within	itself	the	
condition	of	understanding	the	truth	(and	naïvely	assumes	that	
every	other	philosopher	agrees	with	him!),	but	this	is	the	very	
view	which	has	been	subjected	 to	 such	devastating	criticism	
by	modern	metaphysics	and	science	(as	well	as	by	theologians	
like	Barth	and	Brunner)	on	 the	ground	 that	 it	 fails	utterly	 to	
meet	critical	metaphysics	and	science	on	their	own	grounds.
The	very	 fact	 that	my	 criticisms	 appear	 to	 him	only	 like	
a	“juggling	with	words”	 shows	 that	Professor	Blanshard	 sits	
so	securely	in	his	idealist	parlour	that	real	argument	with	him	
is	hardly	possible,	except	on	his	own	idealist	presuppositions.	
Otherwise	one	can	only	call	in	question	his	whole	philosophy.	
That,	of	course,	is	not	possible	to	do	here,	even	if	it	be	in	the	
columns	 of	 a	 daily	 newspaper	 of	 the	 dignity	 and	 culture	 of	
The Scotsman,	but	there	are	several	points	that	require	further	
clarification.
Long	 ago,	 in	 Edinburgh	 University,	 David	 Hume,	 in	
his	 “Dialogues	 Concerning	 Natural	 Religion,”	 taught	 us	
to	 observe	 the	 distinction	 between	 ectypal	 and	 archetypal	
analogy	when	he	protested	against	projecting	into	theology	the	
ectypal	 analogies	drawn	 from	 the	world	of	nature	 as	 though	
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they	were	 archetypal.	That	 is	 precisely	 the	 protest	 that	Karl	
Barth	 has	 raised	 in	 the	 whole	 field	 of	 natural	 theology.	 For	
him	the	objective	revelation	of	God	in	the	historical	Christ	is	
archetypal	 and	governs	 all	 our	 theological	 analogies,	 though	
ectypal	analogies	may	be	drawn	from	the	world	of	nature	 to	
articulate	faith	but	not	to	construct	it.
A	volume	of	Hume’s	“Dialogues”	was	first	thrust	into	my	
hands	when	I	was	a	student	by	Professor	Norman	Kemp	Smith	
with	the	remark	that	it	would	destroy	a	lot	of	bad	theology!	If	
only	David	Hume	could	be	resurrected	and	brought	back	as	a	
Gifford	Lecturer!
Further,	 what	 does	 Professor	 Blanshard	 mean	 by	 “mere	
conformity	to	an	object”?	In	his	discussion	of	Anselm’s	“faith	
seeking	to	understand	the	Truth,”	Karl	Barth	points	out	that	the	
rationality	of	 faith	 involves	a	 three-fold	 ratio,	 in	 the	 rational	
experience	 of	 faith,	 in	 the	 rational	 conformity	 of	 faith	 to	 its	
object,	and	in	the	ratio	of	the	Truth	itself	which	is	fundamental.	
That	 is	 the	view	which	Barth	 took	over	 from	Anselm	and	 it	
needs	no	commentary	to	bring	out	the	radical	misinterpretation	
of	 Barth’s	 teaching	 here	 shown	 by	 Professor	 Blanshard’s	
letters.
The	great	difficulty	about	theological	knowledge	is	its	bi-
polar	character:	that	knowledge	of	God	must	be	expressed	in	
terms	of	what	it	is	not.	That	bi-polar	character	is	nowhere	more	
evident	than	in	the	Christian	doctrine	of	the	Incarnation,	and	
of	 the	knowledge	of	God	not	as	He	 is	 in	Himself	but	 in	 the	
form	of	Man,	in	Jesus	Christ	who	is	both	God	and	Man.	It	was	
because	they	were	anxious	to	face	that	fact	honestly	(to	behave	
consciously	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	the	object!)	that	Barth	and	
Brunner	became	dialectical	theologians.
That	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 “they	 accepted	 both	 sides	 of	 a	
contradiction,”	 as	 Professor	 Blanshard	 mistakenly	 assumes,	
but	that	they	recognised	the	importance	and	depth	of	paradox	
in	 the	 human	 expression	 of	 the	 truth	 and	 that	 they	 were	
prepared	 to	 say	 “yes”	 and	 “no”	 at	 crucial	 points	 of	 an	 issue	
where	 a	 scholastic	 distinction	 would	 falsify	 the	 truth	 and	
where	a	 logical	synthesis	would	only	force	an	abortive	unity	
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against	the	facts.	As	theologians	neither	was	content	to	remain	
“dialectical,”	 and	 it	 is	many	years	 now	 since	 that	 stage	was	
left	behind.	Brunner	moved	back	 in	a	 scholastic	direction	 in	
the	 drawing	 of	 distinctions,	 but	 for	Barth	 progress	 has	 been	
different.	His	massive	mind	has	refused	to	allow	the	distinctions	
of	expression	to	have	the	same	depth,	and	depth	in	being,	that	
they	are	allowed	with	Brunner,	for	they	do	not	correspond	to	
distinctions	in	reality	–	e.g.,	the	distinction	between	revelation	
in	 creation	 and	 revelation	 through	 the	 Word.	 Accordingly	
Karl	Barth	has	sought	to	evolve	a	new	method	of	theological	
exposition	in	which,	while	seeking	out	 in	Anselmian	fashion	
the	full	rationality	of	faith	in	obedience	to	the	Truth,	he	tries	
to	formulate	and	communicate	it	as	a	whole.	That	is	why	the	
“Kirchliche	Dogmatik”	has	become	so	enormous	in	bulk.
Throughout	 all	 this	 rational	 theological	 activity	 Barth	 is	
acutely	 aware	 of	what	 Professor	Dorothy	 Emmet	 has	 called	
the	“analogical	relation	to	the	Transcendent”	–	the	fact	that	the	
nature	of	God	is	such	that	He	always	transcends	the	concepts	
and	analogies	in	terms	of	which	we	seek	to	articulate	our	faith	
in	Him.	That	is	what	Anselm	called	humilis sapientia,	which	
he	opposed	to	the	insipiens superbia	of	the	reason	which	has	
never	learned	to	wonder.—I	am	&c.	
ThomaS f. Torrance.
Letter from Blanshard
published	in The Scotsman,	April	30,	1952,	p.	6
Theology of Crisis
University	of	St	Andrews,
April	28,	1952
Sir,—In	 several	 long	 letters	 published	 in	 your	 columns,	
Professor	 Torrance	 has	 taken	 me	 to	 task	 for	 calling	 the	
theologians	 Brunner	 and	 Barth	 irrationalists.	 I	 offered	 in	
reply	 a	 series	 of	 passages	 from	 their	 own	writings	 in	which	
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it	was	maintained:	 (1)	 that	our	natural	 reason	does	and	must	
break	down	when	 it	 seeks	a	knowledge	of	God,	and	(2)	 that	
God	 is	 so	 different	 from	 the	world	 that	His	 nature	 is	 bound	
to	present	itself	to	our	reason	as	“foolishness”	and	even	self-
contradiction.	To	my	mind	these	statements	were	conclusive.	
For	what	 could	 irrationalism	mean	 if	 not	 that	 the	 real	 is,	 to	
our	 reason,	 unintelligible	 and	 incoherent?	And	yet	Professor	
Torrance	holds	 that	“Barth	stands	out	 in	Europe	as	 the	great	
protagonist	against	irrationalism.”
What	is	his	ground	for	this	view?	This:	that	if	we	redefine	
reason	 to	 mean	 conformity	 with	 an	 object,	 we	 can	 make	
Barth	out	to	be	a	kind	of	rationalist,	even	if	such	conformity	
means	the	abandonment	of	 the	laws	and	standards	of	natural	
reason.	To	 this	my	answer	 is	 that	 such	conformity	 is	merely	
meaningless:	it	is	not	reason,	but	the	suicide	of	reason.	A	kind	
of	knowledge	which	soars	so	high	as	to	have	left	mere	logic	
behind	has	simply	evaporated	as	knowledge.	
Professor	Torrance	 tries	 to	 convey	 the	 idea	of	what	 such	
knowledge	might	be	by	references	to	“archetypal	and	ectypal	
analogies,”	 “three-fold	 ratios,”	 and	 the	 distinction	 between	
humilis sapientia	and	insipiens superbia	which	suggest	that	he	
is	trying	to	cross	from	reason	to	non-rational	knowledge	by	a	
bridge	of	degrees.	But	listen	to	Brunner	himself	on	all	this	(I	
take	Brunner	rather	that	Barth	because	he	puts	the	position	far	
more	clearly):	revelation,	he	says,	is	“what	no	man	can	know,	
what	is	in	no	kind	of	continuity	with	our	human	ideas,	no,	not	
even	with	the	best	and	highest	we	possess;”	it	 is	“the	end	of	
all	 objectivity	 ...	 or,	 rationalism;”	 it	 is	 “something	which	 is	
distinguished	not	gradually	or	quantitatively,	but	qualitatively,	
from	anything	which	man	can	know	...”	(“The	Word	and	the	
World.”	 45,	 75,	 17.)	 Could	 there	 be	 a	 flatter	 denial	 of	 the	
interpretation	Professor	Torrance	 is	offering	 for	 the	 theology	
of	crisis?
When	I	suggest	 that	 the	 issue	 is	simple	and	clean-cut,	he	
replies	 that	 it	 “involves	 the	 whole	 philosophical	 debate	 of	
modern	 times,”	 and	 invokes	 a	 series	 of	 impressive	 names	
running	from	St	Anselm’s	day	to	our	own.	I	should	be	appalled	
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at	the	prospect	of	embroiling	myself	with	this	galaxy	of	saints	
and	sages.	And	surely	it	is	unnecessary.	My	argument	is	one	that	
any	reader	of	this	journal	can	understand	and	judge,	whether	he	
has	ever	heard	of	St	Anselm	or	not.	It	is	this:	Whoever	says	that	
reality	does	and	must	flout	our	reason	is	an	irrationalist;	Barth	
and	Brunner	plainly	say	this;	therefore	they	are	irrationalists.
Professor	Torrance	thinks	it	dogmatic	to	hold	that	the	real	
must	conform	to	the	standards	of	our	reason;	he	suggests	that	
if	I	say	this,	it	is	because	I	am	an	idealist,	and	everyone	knows	
that	 idealism	 is	 dated.	 Now	 he	 is	 much	 surer	 that	 I	 am	 an	
idealist	than	I	am;	it	is	a	name	I	never	claim	for	myself,	however	
much	I	owe	to	this	great	school.	And	if	he	is	suggesting	that	
the	rationality	of	the	real,	in	the	sense	of	its	self-consistency,	
is	a	doctrine	peculiar	to	Idealists,	I	am	nonplussed	again;	for	
the	doctrine	is	held	as	firmly	by	the	arch-enemy	of	idealism,	
Moore,	as	it	was	by	Bradley	himself;	 indeed	it	 is	held	by	all	
philosophic	schools	except	that	of	skepticism.
This	 is	 significant.	 It	 suggests	 where	 Barth	 and	 Brunner	
really	stand.	Their	theology,	like	that	of	Newman	and	Pascal,	
is	built	on	despair	of	human	reason.	They	hope	by	renouncing	
reason	 to	 save	 religion.	 It	 is	 a	 bad	 exchange.	 If	 you	 do	 not	
accept	both,	you	will	end	with	neither.—I	am	&c.
Brand BlanShard.
[This	correspondence	is	closed.—ed.]
Notes
1
		 London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1939,	2	vols.
2
		 My	 father	 did	 not	 transfer	 to	 the	Chair	 of	 Christian	Dogmatics	
until	1	October	1952.
3
		 In	 a	 letter	 dated	 10	December	 1991,	The Scotsman	 granted	me	
permission	to	re-print	the	letters	in	the	context	of	an	article.	My	
father’s	death	on	2	December	2007	prompted	me	finally	to	do	this,	
and	I	am	grateful	to	my	wife	Morag	(who	always	got	on	excellently	
with	my	father,	one	direct	person	to	another)	who	did	most	of	the	
work.
